China Since Tiananmen

4th June is an anniversary of Tiananmen incident, wherein violent confrontations took place in Beijing in 1989 between armed forces and large groups standing against the Communist government. In China, the event is referred as Fourth June Incident to avoid confusion over earlier protests at the Tiananmen Square, particularly the Tiananmen Incident of 1976 and May Fourth Movement of 1919. The protest against political establishment and subsequent crackdown happened at a time when anti-communist movements were sweeping across Eastern Europe and policies of Perestroika-Glasnost were order of the day in the USSR. The 1989 protest was conglomeration of section of ex-members of CCP (Chinese Communist Party), of the Trotskyites, of the urban workers, of the students and of the intellectuals. Demands of agitating leaders were vague in nature and lacked theoretical perspective required for converting dissent into nationwide movement based on ideological alternative. The urban workers’ concerns were job insecurity and inflation, both had been result of economic reforms. The intellectuals were clear in demanding political reforms and freedom of expression therein. The students wanted immediate steps to curb corruption and punish corrupt government and CCP officials. In a way, the protest was not aimed at overthrowing the CCP regime in one stroke but asking the Party itself to initiate process of broad political reforms.

CCP leadership was sympathetic to these demands, except for immediate political reforms. Further, political liberalization for attaining western style democracy was completely ruled out. Deng Xiaoping’s resolute handling of 1989 protesters was based on the theoretical framework that could be summarised as follows: China is witnessing the primary stage of socialism, which will continue for many more years; Development of forces of production is the utmost task before the CCP and the Chinese people and; only CCP’s supremacy can ensure political stability required for massive economic development. Deng Xiaoping was convinced that loosening of CCP’s authority would pave way for chaotic years, which would hamper the economic modernization programme. He knew that CCP’s legitimacy would come from his economic modernization programme, which had doubled the per capita income of Chinese people in one decade.

Deng Xiaoping’s decisiveness in clamping down on Tiananmen protesters had deeply disappointed his western admirers, who expected him to become Gorbachev of China. On the other hand, he silenced his ultra-left detractors of being a ‘capitalist road taker.’ The 1989 incident did not shake Deng Xiaoping’s belief in his economic modernization programme and he refused ground to neo-Maoist section within Party to turn the clock back to the policies of Cultural Revolution era. Post-1989, the CCP ensured that it would remain in control of the economic modernization programme and would not allow either the ultra-left elements to put breaks to it nor to capitalist interests to take over the decision making process at the highest level.

Chinese government was subject to severe criticism in international media over its use of force against agitators. The capitalist forces all over the world were overjoyed with the probable fall of socialist government in China and propagated systemic change in the country sooner than later. In this context, we can witness four noticeable things in today’s China. One, the 1989 protesters could not regroup since then. The paradox of Fourth June Incident was liberal intellectuals leading a section of urban workers who were dismayed by the pace of restructuring of State-Owning-Enterprises (SOEs). Another paradox was protesting students’ disillusionment with Marxism-Leninism but their inability to find an alternative that would have made China as developed as the western countries. Once Chinese state cracked down on the protesters, these contradictions ensured that the dissenters won’t come together in the near future. The rural populace remained indifferent to the 1989 conflict for many of them, if not all, had experienced dramatic improvement in their standard of living under Deng Xiaoping regime.

Two, the CCP maintained its position that in 1989 use of force was necessary. This continued support for clampdown on agitators in 1989 is significant. The CCP has a long tradition of self-criticism and critical evaluation of the past as well as criticism of its tall leaders. Entire Maoist era was full of such episodes wherein the CCP or a section of leadership in it found faults with party’s policies and methods; whether it’s Hundred Flowers Movement or the Great Leap Forward. This led to intense ideological struggles within the CCP. In the post-Mao period, the Cultural Revolution as well as cult politics came under severe criticism. However, handling of the Tiananmen protest had never been a subject of self-criticism for CCP neither was criticised by any noteworthy section within the party. Since Tiananmen protests the CCP has witnessed two generational leadership changes and the third leadership transfer is in the offing. At no point of time, the new leaderships tried to torpedo legacy of Deng Xiaoping and his associates over the Fourth June Incident ; either overtly or covertly. This indicates overwhelming mood within CCP for necessity of continuance of One-Party System and firmness in dealing with dissents, which challenges its legitimacy to govern.

Three, there has been no system change with CCP firmly in control of affairs. In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen protest, Chinese government brought the inflation under control and put breaks on indiscriminate restructuring of SOEs. This was helpful in taming the dissent within urban workers. Similarly, cases against corrupt officials were fast-tracked and even death penalty was handed to few of the perpetrators of financial crimes. These measures were symbolic in nature as corruption in China has been the systemic problem. Even then, it helped in restoring confidence among ordinary Chinese citizens about leadership’s intention to get rid of corrupt officials. CCP’s continuous campaign, in post-Tiananmen phase, against the return of chaos and political instability had its impact. A generation, which faced hardships during Cultural Revolution, rallied behind the Chinese government. More importantly, the CCP succeeded in impressing upon the people that economic modernization was much more necessary than the political reforms. An ordinary Chinese citizen, post-Tiananmen, aspires more for economic prosperity than for political reforms. Most of them desire to get rich and richer, while collectively they want China to overtake Unites States in all the spheres. Chinese government further gained its legitimacy from successful handling of complex issues of national importance like unification of Hong Kong and Macau, bombing of Chinese embassy in former Yugoslavia and prolonged negotiations over accession to WTO. The recently held Beijing Olympics was also utilised by CCP to gain popularity among the people.

Four, very significant developments have taken place in China since 1989 at the political and societal level under the supervision of CCP that has great implications on state-society relations. The right to property has been officially acknowledged and the Party opened up its doors to those who have become affluent, and influential thereof, as a result of economic modernization programme. The thoughts of Three Represents promulgated by Jiang Zemin and theory of Scientific Development for building Harmonious Society as constructed by Hu Jintao showed that the CCP has further moved away from Maoist notion of class struggle in China. The Chinese population has become more mobile with influx of rural population into cities in search of work and flight of Chinese students to foreign universities in the hope of better opportunities abroad. Direct elections are encouraged at the grass-root level, which has now become an important feature of village politics in China. At some places, non-CCP members have trounced the party members in these local elections. Similarly, protests by farmers and workers against local authorities have become common in today’s China. In most of time, such protests erupt due to mismanagement, corruption or atrocities by local officials. Today, thousands of organizations are functional throughout China working in different fields ranging from environmental issues to care of old age persons. Occasionally, these non-party, non-governmental organizations lobby with the CCP and the government on issues of their concerns. China’s urban market is full of various regular publications in which the common feature is absence of political matters. On the other hand, Chinese bloggers are vociferous in their political writings and sometimes critical of Party and State. At the end of year 2009, China had record 384 million internet users with 120 million using mobile internet applications. Internet usage for banking, booking travels and doing commerce is popular among its users in China.

Post-Tiananmen, China has been traversing unparalleled path. This phase has, indeed, been most stable and productive for China in last two centuries. While adhering to Deng Xiaoping’s conceptualisation of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, the post-Deng leadership has concentrated more on development of productive forces. It is also taking up challenges emanating from economic modernization programme and opening up to the outside world, like bridging the divide between coastal and inland China and addressing the disparity between rich and poor people. The real issue, so far untouched by CCP leadership, is when will China accomplish Primary Stage of Socialism and how will it enter next stage. It believes that the present stage will continue for many more years. If one takes a clue from the Chinese history; any systemic transition in China, whether entering into next stage of Socialism or embracing political liberalization, will be intensely turbulent. Today, no one is prepared for the inevitable.

References:
1. Minqi, Li, China: Six Years After Tiananmen, in History as it Happened: Selected articles from Monthly Review 1949-1998, compiled by Ortiz, Bobbye S. And Tilak D. Gupta, third impression July 2006, Cornerstone publications.
2. http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE60E06S20100115

Small Is Not Necessarily Beautiful

On 14th January, Jansatta published an article on separate statehood by Dhananjay Rai. The scholarly article is informative as well as provocatively thoughtful. It provides good insights into ever increasing demands for newer states in Indian republic and changing nature of basis for such regional temptations. I am eager to write few comments on the matter, but initially want to summarize the arguments for better understanding of the issues raised by Dhananjay Rai.
1. Freedom struggle and immediate aftermath of independence was dominated by the thinking that nation-state was the unit for development. This understanding was shackled in early 1950s with movements for linguistic states wherein development and language were seen as two sides of the same coin. As a result, states were reorganized mostly on the basis of language. Andhra Pradesh was the first state created on linguistic basis in 1953 as a consequence of VishalAndhra movement. In 1960, Maharashtra and Gujarat were formed, while Tamilnadu came into existence in 1969 and Karnataka in 1973. Punjab and Haryana were created in 1966 and Himachal Pradesh earned the statehood in 1971. Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura became states in 1972 and Nagaland came into existence as a state in 1973. During this period, Orissa and Kerala were also reorganized on the basis of linguistic unity. Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram were granted full statehood in 1987. Later on Goa was also converted from Union Territory status to the state.
2. The states created on the basis of language produced uneven level of developments in its regions, thus invoking the feeling of deprivation, and even exploitation, in the underdeveloped areas of these states. As a result, development has been dissociated from the language and linked to the region. This was the basis for creation of Chattisgarh, Uttarakhand and Jharkhand in the year 2000. Demands for new states are also based on similar conception of deliberate underdevelopment of the regions in various states. These demands prominently include creation of Telangana, Seemanchal (in Bihar), Vidarbha, Maru Bhumi (In Rajasthan), Budelkhand (parts of UP and MP), Harit Pradesh (in UP), Poorvanchal (Eastern UP and parts of Bihar), Bodoland, Gorakhaland, Tulunadu (parts of Karnataka and Kerala), Saurashtra, Kodagu (in Karnataka), Vindhya Pradesh (in MP) etc.
3. The case is not as simple as it is being presented and there are various aspects related to demands for new states. Firstly, there are examples where people of particular regions are united in demanding separate statehood based on their understanding of reasons for their underdevelopment. Secondly, higher castes and class in some regions are trying to establish their supremacy taking advantage of demands for separate statehoods. The powerful castes have accepted democracy as a sort of compromise as they are hapless due to their small numeric strength. In bigger states, the powerful castes were forced for compromises by the masses. However, the extent of mass assertion and nature of compromises by powerful castes is a matter of debate. Creation of smaller states promises more independence to powerful castes, mainly due to comparatively greater numerical presence of these castes in the concerned regions. Haryana exemplifies this phenomenon. The post 1991 globalization has produced and strengthened bourgeoisie at the regional level whereas bourgeoisie was concentrated in few areas erstwhile. Increasing demands for newer states is result of emergence of regional bourgeoisie.
4. A contrasting phenomenon, symbolized in the demand for Harit Pradesh, is also emerging wherein comparatively developed region in the state wants to separate themselves for better administration of their resources and development potentials. If such regions lacked quality administration, how have they emerged as better off in the state? The demand for Harit Pradesh, as articulated by Ajit Singh, clearly demonstrates rise of powerful castes and its efforts to strengthen the grip on power.
5. To conclude, it is not correct that powerful castes and class have lost the leverage in existing centre-state structure. At the same time, small states will definitely help powerful castes and class to strengthen their hold on power structure.
I will neither agree with this theorization nor reject it. Constraints of newspaper article are evident and the statement that smaller states suits regional bourgeoisie needs interrogation. Instead, I would like to share some instant thoughts on the subject.
1. Idea of reorganization of states on linguistic basis captured imagination during the freedom struggle itself and Congress party promised the same several times during pre-independence period. It was propagated more to dismiss regional fears of cultural and linguistic domination of Hindi, particularly raised due to Gandhiji’s emphasis on making it the national language. Another major consideration was conducting the government business in the language known to states’ subjects. The issue of better administration was, thus, addressed by bringing the areas of one language in one state to the extent possible. This objective was partially achieved by reorganization of states, however, the courts and higher bureaucracy continued to function using English as medium.
2. Post-independence, the Congress showed reluctance for reorganization of states and people’s movements compelled the central government to take steps in this direction. If we characterize the Congress regime as conglomeration of bourgeoisie and feudal elements, it could be derived that the bourgeoisie of that time was reluctant for reorganization of states on linguistic basis. This, however, does not mean that in the present context demands for smaller states are not spearheaded by the regional bourgeoisie.
3. In my observation, particularly in terms of demand for Vidarbha, certain sections are more zealous for separate state. Prominent among them are politicians, contractors and traders. The politicians visualize their bigger influence and role in smaller states as they are overshadowed by their counterparts from the richer and developed parts in existing state. In Vidarbha, politicians across parties including the Dalit parties favor separate state. The contractors and traders face the heat from their counterparts in the richer and developed parts of the state. They wish to limit role of the latter by creating separate state entity where they could grab all the government contracts and trade policies favorable to them. Politicians, contractors and traders from different castes demonstrate unity of purpose with this regard.
4. On the contrary, there has been example of Uttarakhand wherein demand for separate statehood was spearheaded by Upper castes as a reaction to OBC-Dalit dominated politics of united U.P. The upper castes are in majority in Uttarakhand. In Chattisgarh, upper caste politicians from the region who influenced united M.P’s politics for many years, found themselves sidelined by the masses. The new political leadership has begun to call the shots in Chattisgarh soon after its creation. The same can be said about Jharkhand.
5. States of very small size are more prone to political instability; e.g Goa and north-eastern states. The big and medium size states have provided relatively stable governments with Jharkhand as the major exception.
6. Jharkhand and Chattisgarh have seen surge in Maoist activities after their creation. The Maoists support demands for Telangana, Vidarbha and Gorakhaland.
The contemporary movements or demands present no blueprints, single or multiple, for development of desired state. Mere creation of more states can result into increased administrative costs adding to further deprivation of these underdeveloped regions. There are two important points that need intense deliberations before demanding separate statehood for underdeveloped region. First, discourse on poverty elimination is largely missing while discussing developmental issues. Similarly, issue of devolution of maximum possible powers to local governmental bodies remains unaddressed. Unless these issues of immense importance are neglected by the proponents of smaller states, there is strong ground to uphold Dhananjay Rai’s assessment that such demands serve interest of regional bourgeoisie.